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A B S T R A C T 
This study aims to determine the effect of financial rewards (given and not given), personal costs (low 
and high) and reporting channels (anonymous and non-anonymous) on whistleblowing intentions. This 
study also analyzes the interaction effects among financial reward and personal cost, financial reward 
and reporting channel as well as personal cost and reporting channel on whistleblowing intentions. 
Participants in this study involve 65 finance and accounting employees of state universities in Bali. 
This research employs a 2x2x2 experimental design. The results of this study indicate that 
whistleblowing intentions are greater when given financial rewards compared to not given financial 
rewards, in low personal cost compared with a high personal cost, reported through anonymous 
reporting channels than in non-anonymous reporting channels. The results of the interaction effect 
indicate that greater whistleblowing occurs when given a financial reward (case at a low personal 
cost), through non-anonymous reporting channels. The results also confirm that higher whistleblowing 
intentions appear in a low personal cost through anonym reporting channels. 
© 2020 by the authors. Licensee BSC International Publishing, Istanbul, Turkey. This article is an open 
access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC 




In ACFE Indonesia (2016) conducted a fraud survey in Indonesia, emphasizing that tipping contributed to higher fraud in Indonesia 
(37%). Such finding postulated that whistleblowing serves as a good fraud detection method. On the other side, whistleblowing 
unfortunately causes a dilemma as people are discouraged from becoming whistleblowers due to the fear of retaliation. Based on the 
results of a survey conducted by IBE (2017), it was concluded that as many as 56% of employees who were aware of the fraud, 
choose to remain silent and to not report the fraud. Research conducted by James et al. (1995) stated that almost one-sixth 
whistleblowers who received negative consequences from their actions were reluctant to conduct any whistleblowing. However, 
whistleblowers (90%) who did not receive negative consequences of their actions, mentioned about future possibility to commit 
whistleblowing. Relevant study has suggested that retaliation is believed to reduce whistleblowing intentions; even such effort could 
hamper fraud detection and eradication in Indonesia. 
It has been common where regulators in developed and developing countries attempt to encourage whistleblowing intentions such as 
by giving rewards to whistleblowers (Andon et al., 2016). Albeit rewards have been enacted, there are still many people who are 
hesitant to do whistleblowing due to fear of the negative consequences. The personal cost of whistleblowing is important to be 
minimized in providing a sense of security for the doers, encouraging effective efforts to prevent and eradicate fraud.  There are 
several types of reporting channels such as anonymous and non-anonymous reporting channels, in which each channel has unique 
strengths and weaknesses along with different possibilities in generating fraud reporting intentions (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005).  
Anonymous reporting channels encourage whistleblowing intentions due to lower personal costs (Kaplan & Schultz, 2007). Non-
anonymous reporting offers opportunities to improve reporting integrity and enable more effective reporting systems in enforcing 
any suspicious actions (Kaplan & Schultz, 2007). Upon referring to such phenomenon, this study intends to determine the effect of 
financial rewards (given and not given), personal costs (low and high) and reporting channels (anonymous and non-anonymous) on 
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whistleblowing intentions. This study will also analyze the interaction effects among financial reward and personal cost, financial 
reward and reporting channel and personal cost and reporting channel on whistleblowing intentions.  
This paper presents the result of experimental study about the effect of financial reward, personal cost and reporting channels on 
whistleblowing intention. We find that whistleblowing intentions are greater when given financial, in low personal cost compared 
with high personal cost, reported through anonymous reporting channels than in non-anonymous reporting channels. The results of 
the interaction effect indicate that greater whistleblowing occurs when given a financial reward and at a low personal cost, 
whistleblowing intentions through non-anonymous reporting channels will be higher when given a financial reward. The results also 
confirm that higher whistleblowing intentions appear in a low personal cost through anonym reporting channels. 
Literature Review 
Several relevant theories such as Theory of Planned Behaviour, Prosocial Behaviour Theory and Utilitarian Theory highlight that 
someone will evaluate or assess whether the behavior is favorable in accordance with a motive to achieve personal gain. Other 
considerations lie on the social pressure to do or not do such behavior. Someone will evaluate the ease or difficulty encountered to 
conduct behavior and how someone can be convinced, whether the existing circumstances support or hinder the decided action. 
Therefore, a decision-maker is required to consider the impact or consequences of each alternative and to decide a more beneficial 
option for all concerned parties (Brief & Motowildo, 1986; Dozier & Micelli, 1985; Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen, 2002; Cavanagh et al., 
1981). 
Financial reward and whistleblowing intention 
Prosocial Behavior Theory defines whistleblowing as an act that is not only based on altruism, but also on egoism. Altruism refers 
that whistleblowing is committed for the benefit of greater community. However, egoism emphasizes that whistleblowing at a certain 
level contains a motive to achieve personal gain (Dozier & Miceli, 1985). Based on the explanation from the Prosocial Behavior 
Theory, providing financial rewards to whistleblowers is expected to encourage whistleblowing intentions. Previous researches on 
the effect of financial reward on whistleblowing intentions indicated that financial reward influenced whistleblowing intentions; or 
in other words, given financial rewards would encourage whistleblowing intentions (Andon et al., 2016; Schmolke & Utikal,2016; 
Butler et al., 2017; and Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008).  Based on this explanation, the hypothesis is: 
H1: Whistleblowing will be greater, if given a financial reward compared to not given a financial reward. 
Personal cost and whistleblowing intention 
Theory of Planned Behavior explains personal cost in the subjective norm, where the social factors such as perceived social factor 
pressures in committing or not committing an action (Ajzen, 1991). Retaliation that will be received by whistleblowers is normally 
in a form of social pressure. The threat or fear of retaliation greatly reduces the intention of whistleblowing (Mesmer-magnus & 
Viswesvaran, 2005). Personal cost is considered to hinder whistleblowing intentions, as proven by previous studies (Ayers & Kaplan, 
2005; Mesmer-magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Alleyne et al., 2013; Boo et al., 2016).  confirming that personal cost presents a 
negative effect on whistleblowing intentions. Based on this explanation, the hypothesis is: 
H2: Whistleblowing intention will be greater in low personal cost compared to high personal cost. 
Reporting channel and whistleblowing intention 
Planned Behavior Theory (perceived behavioral control) puts more highlights on explanation towards individual’s decision in 
determining either anonymous or non-anonymous reporting channel. Perceived behavioral control refers to expectations regarding 
the extent to which an individual performs certain behaviors to overcome both internal and external obstacles (Ajzen, 2002). The 
referred inhibiting factor is the possibility of a threat of retaliation towards the whistleblower. Although there is a possibility of 
retaliation from reporting fraud, there is also a solution to eliminate personal cost by providing anonymous reporting channels, taken 
into consideration by individuals whether whistleblowing is committed. Anonymous reporting channels encourage whistleblowing 
intentions since personal costs are much lower when a whistleblower utilizes anonymous reporting channels than that in non-
anonymous (Kaplan & Schultz, 2007). Prior relevant studies on anonymous and non-anonymous reporting channels (Johansson & 
Carey, 2016; Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Kaplan et al., 2012) pointed out that anonymous reporting channels influence whistleblowing 
intentions. Based on this explanation, the hypothesis is: 
H3: Whistleblowing will be greater when reporting through the anonymous reporting channel. 
Financial reward, personal cost and whistleblowing intentions 
Theory of Planned Behavior explains that an individual takes an action based on several predictors, such as: attitude towards behavior 
and social factor called subjective norm. Attitude towards behavior marks the level at which an individual evaluates or assesses 
whether the behavior is favorable (Ajzen, 1991). Prosocial behavior theory also explains that an individual committing 
whistleblowing also has a motive to achieve personal gain (Dozier & Miceli, 1985). The second predictor is a social factor called 
subjective norm, which refers to the perceived social pressure to do or to not do a behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Heungsik & Blenkinsopp, 
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2009). Individual will also consider the reactions of surrounding community when figuring out any whistleblowing deed. An apparent 
negative reaction such a threat of retaliation is believed to reduce whistleblowing intentions, which is in line with Abraham Maslow's 
hierarchy of needs theory postulating that everyone needs a sense of security. Research conducted by Guthrie & Taylor (2017) 
clarified that whistleblowing intentions will be greater if the whistleblower is given financial rewards at low personal cost. Based on 
this explanation, the hypothesis is: 
H4: Whistleblowing will be greater if given a financial reward and at a low personal cost 
Financial reward, reporting channel and whistleblowing intentions 
Theories of Planned Behavior and Prosocial Behavior signify that an individual will evaluate or assess whether the behavior is 
favorable due to a personal motive to achieve personal gain (Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Ajzen, 1991). Financial rewards are expected 
to be a driving factor for increasing whistleblowing intentions. Another consideration for an individual committing a whistleblowing 
action is the obligation to consider the impact or consequences of each alternative deciding a more beneficial action for all concerned 
parties (Cavanagh et al., 1981). One of the considerations before conducting whistleblowing is to consider which reporting channels 
to conduct whistleblowing providing more benefits for all involved parties. Non-anonymous reporting channels provide benefit for 
organizations as it offers opportunities to improve reporting integrity and to enable more effective reporting systems in fraud detection 
and prevention (Kaplan & Schultz, 2007). Non-anonymous reporting channels also benefit whistleblowers due to easier means in 
providing financial rewards. Research conducted by Pope & Lee, 2012 pointed out that a financial reward encouraged an individual 
to report through a non-anonymous reporting channel. Based on this explanation, the hypothesis is: 
H5: Whistleblowing will be greater if given financial rewards and through non-anonymous reporting channels. 
Personal cost, reporting channels and whistleblowing intentions 
Theory of Planned Behavior (perceived behavioral control) refers to an individual's perception of the ease or difficulty encountered 
to conduct a behavior due to supporting and inhibiting factors (Ajzen, 2002; Zakaria et al., 2016). The obstacles when committing 
whistleblowing, such as the threat of retaliation. Research conducted by Priyastiwi & Halim (2018) states that employees will dare 
to report fraud that occurs in their work environment when they get support from their supervisor. Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of 
needs theory postulating that everyone needs a sense of security, anonymous reporting channels encourage whistleblowing intentions 
due to lower personal costs and give a sense of security (Kaplan & Schultz, 2007). Prior study on the influence of personal costs and 
reporting channels was conducted by (Kaplan et al., 2012; Priyastiwi & Halim, 2018), indicating that whistleblowing intentions will 
be higher if committed at low personal cost conditions through anonymous reporting channels. Based on this explanation, the 
hypothesis is: 
H6: Whistleblowing intentions will be higher when at a low personal cost and through anonymous reporting channels.  
Research and Methodology 
This research applies a 2x2x2 experimental design. Three independent variables (financial rewards, personal cost, reporting channels) 
will each be exposed to two treatments: financial reward (given and not given), personal cost (personal costs and no personal costs), 
and reporting channels (anonymous and non-anonymous). The assignment of participants in this experimental study is performed 
between-subject. 
Table 1: Experiment group 
  Personal cost  No personal cost  
Anonym Non-Anonym Anonym Non-Anonym 
Given financial reward Grup 1 Grup 3 Grup 5 Grup 7 
Not given financial 
reward 
Grup 2 Grup 4 Grup 6 Grup 8 
 
Participant 
This research was conducted at state universities in Bali. The participants of this experiment include all employees (65) of the finance 
and accounting department of State Universities in Bali.  
Manipulation 
There are two types of manipulation in the financial reward (given and not given), based on the regulation concerning a financial 
reward when reporting fraud and based on the regulation concerning no financial reward when reporting fraud. There are two types 
of manipulation in personal cost variables (high personal cost and low personal cost), which are mutation (for the reporter in high 
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personal cost) and support from supervisor (for the reporter in low personal cost). The treatment of anonymous reporting channel is 
normally presented in the form of reporting by excluding the reporter identity. In contrast, the treatment of non-anonymous reporting 
channel in reporting includes the reporter identity. 
Experiment procedure 
The procedure of determining the group for each participant is accomplished by employing random assignment method, randomly 
dividing the participants into eight groups through the draw. The random assignment procedure in this study includes participants 
(who will be collected at their respective workplaces), in which the draw is created based on total number of participants and number 
of formed groups. Each lottery will be numbered as one to eight, which indicates the number of the group where the participants will 
be placed. Upon obtaining the lottery number, the participants are presented with a scenario (based on selected group), where each 
group receives a different experimental treatment; participants answer the questions in scenario by giving check-marks. 
Data Analysis Technique 
ANOVA (analysis of variance) is used to test the hypothesis specifically the main and interaction effect.  
Results and Discussions  
The results of the hypothesis test аre presented below. 
Tаble 2: Result of hypotesis one test 
Financial Reward N Mean SD F hit Sig. Desc 
Given 33 5.682 1.006 19.786 0.000 Significant 
Not Given 32 4.938 0.619 
Total 65 5.315 0.912 
 
Financial reward and whistleblowing intention  
The comparison result of the treatment in financial reward, indicate a significance value of 0,000 or smaller than 0.05, concluding 
significant differences among the treatments on financial reward variables. The average value indicates that the whistleblowing 
intention is greater if given a financial reward compared to not given a financial reward. The results of this study are relevant with 
the Prosocial Behavior Theory explaining that prior to committing whistleblowing; an individual will consider the benefits due to 
personal motive (Chiu, 2002). The provision of financial rewards indicates that the organization appreciates the reported information 
about fraud encouraging an individual to committ whistleblowing (Taylor & Guthrie, 2015). The results of this study also support 
previous studies (Pope & Lee, 2012; Brink et al., 2013; Berger et al., 2017; Feldmen & Lobel, 2010), indicating whistleblowing will 
be greater, if given a financial reward compared to not given a financial reward. 
Personal cost and whistleblowing intention 
The results of the hypothesis test аre presented below. 
Tаble 3: Result of Hypotesis Two Test 
 Personal Cost N Mean SD F hit Sig. Desc 
High 33 4.849 0.775 22.802 0.000 Significant 
Low 32 5.797 0.792 
Total 65 5.315 0.912 
 
The comparison results of treatments on personal cost indicate a significance value of 0,000 (p <0.05), marking significant differences 
among treatments on personal cost variables. The average value among treatments demonstrates that whistleblowing intention will 
be greater at a low personal cost compared with a high personal cost. Thus, the results of this test support Planned Behavior Theory 
(subjective norm) related to normative belief concerning an individual perception towards views of others when committing 
whistleblowing. Individual will consider whether the action is approved thanks to personal motivation to meet the expectations of 
others (Zakaria et al., 2016). Individuals experiencing negative social pressure (such as the threat of retaliation by committing 
whistleblowing) are reluctant due to disadvantageous social pressure. The results of this study are in accordance with previous studies 
(Guthrie & Taylor, 2017; Alleyne et al., 2017; Latan et al., 2017; Alleyne et al, 2013; Hwang et al, 2008), pointing out that 
whistleblowing intention will be greater in low personal cost compared to high personal cost 
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Reporting channel and whistleblowing intention 
The results of the hypothesis test аre presented below. 
Tаble 4: Result of hypothesis three test 
Reporting Channel N Mean SD F hit Sig. Desc 
Anonymous 38 5.118 0.919 4.261 0.043 Significant 
Non-Anonymous 27 5.593 0.844 
Total 65 5.315 0.912 
The comparison results of treatment for reporting channel indicate an average value among treatments emphasizing that 
whistleblowing intention would be greater through anonymous reporting channels. The significance value (0.043) which is smaller 
than 0.05, indicates significant differences among treatments in reporting channel.  
Planned Behavior Theory (Perceived behavioral control and Utilitarian Theory) states that an individual will evaluate the importance 
of control to do whistleblowing such as perceived ease and difficulty or how opportunities or obstacles in committing whistleblowing. 
One also needs to calculate the consequences of each choice to decide more beneficial action for all entitled parties (Zakaria et al., 
2016; Cavanagh et al., 1981).  
Consideration of inhibiting factors such as the possibility of retaliation reduces whistleblowing intentions. The availability of 
anonymous reporting channels is regarded to negate personal costs as it excludes the identity of the reporter. The existence of 
anonymous reporting channels is not only beneficial for the whistleblower but also for the organization because it can streamline the 
implemented whistleblowing system. Thus, the results of this study support previous studies (Pope & Lee, 2012; F et al., 2012; 
Nickolan et al., 2018; Johansson & Carey, 2016), emphasizing that Whistleblowing will be greater when reporting through the 
anonymous reporting channel. 
Financial reward, personal cost and whistleblowing intention 
The results of the hypothesis test аre presented below. 
Tаble 5: Result of hypothesis four test 
Financial Reward Personal Cost N Mean SD F hit Sig. 
Given High 15 5.000 0.964 5.842 0.019 
Low 18 6.250 0.624 
Not Given High 18 4.722 0.575 
Low 14 5.214 0.579 
The comparison results of the average value in the interaction of financial reward and personal cost variables confirm that 
whistleblowing intentions will be greater if given financial rewards at low personal cost conditions.  
The significance value of 0.019 (p <0.05) indicates significant differences among treatments in the interaction of financial reward 
and personal cost variables. The results of this study are in line with Prosocial Behavior Theory and Planned Behavior Theory, 
suggesting that an individual will consider the benefits that will be obtained as well as the costs related to the trust and reaction of 
people (social pressure) in the organization when doing or not doing a certain behavior (Rhodes & Courneya, 2003). 
Individuals will evaluate the benefits and costs of each option. Whistleblowing only occurs if individuals believe that the benefits of 
reporting outweigh personal costs (Hooks et al., 1994). The results of this study are also relevant with previous studies (Taylor & 
Guthrie, 2015; Buccirossi et al., 2017; Guthrie & Taylor, 2017) demonstrating that greater whistleblowing intentions occurs when 
given financial rewards at low personal cost conditions.  
The provision of financial rewards and protection for whistleblowers must be equally strong. Providing financial rewards will not be 
effective if not accompanied by strong protection against threats due to the need for a guarantee of security, which encourages 
whistleblowing intentions and effective whistleblowing system.  
 
 
Financial reward, reporting channel and whistleblowing intention 
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The results of the hypothesis test аre presented below. 
Tаble 6: Result of Hypothesis Five Test 
Financial Reward Reporting Channel N Mean SD F hit Sig. 
Given Anonymous 18 5.333 1.098 5.777 0.019 
Non-Anonymous 15 6.100 0.712 
Not Given Anonymous 20 4.925 0.693 
Non-Anonymous 12 4.958 0.498 
The comparison results of treatments on the interaction of financial reward variables and reporting channels indicate a significance 
value of 0.019 (p <0.05), marking significant differences among the treatments on the interaction of financial reward variables and 
reporting channels. Description of the average value demonstrates results that greater whistleblowing intention occurs when given 
financial rewards through non-anonymous reporting channels. The results of this study support Prosocial Behavior Theory, Theory 
of Planned Behavior and Utilitarian Theory pointing out that an individual takes action based on several considerations such as if 
someone will judge whether the behavior is beneficial to be done. Benefits of whistleblowing for whistleblowers include providing 
financial rewards, career advancement, and recognition (Robertson et al., 2011). Individuals must also consider the consequences of 
each choice and determine beneficial action for all parties (Cavanagh et al., 1981).  
If financial rewards are available, reporters are more likely to reveal their identities rather than remain anonymous (Pope & Lee, 
2012). Similar results are also found in previous studies (Brink et al., 2013; Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008). The availability of non-
anonymous reporting channels in whistleblowers exists due to easier provision of financial rewards because non-anonymous 
reporting channels require reporters to include their identity. This reporting channel also provides benefits for the organization to 
quickly investigate the report and immediately gather up information from the reporter. 
Personal cost, reporting channel and whistleblowing intention 
The results of the hypothesis test аre presented below. 
Tаble 7: Result of hypothesis six test 
Personal Cost Reporting Channel N Mean SD F hit Sig. 
High Anonymous 21 4.548 0.631 10.300 0.002 
Non-Anonymous 12 5.375 0.742 
Low Anonymous 17 5.824 0.706 
Non-Anonymous 15 5.767 0.904 
The comparison results of treatments on the interaction of personal cost and reporting channels depict a significance value of 0.002 
(p <0.05), assuming significant differences among treatments on the interaction of personal cost and reporting channels. Meanwhile, 
the description of the average value indicates that higher whistleblowing intention occurs at a low personal cost through anonymous 
reporting channels. The results of this study support Planned Behavior Theory in subjective norm and perceived behavioral control. 
Subjective norms relate to referents and motivation to comply, in which an individual believes that the referent does approve of 
himself carrying out a behavior, then the individual will consider the social pressure by doing so (Ajzen, 2005 ). 
Individuals tend to commit a behavior after evaluating the possibility of social pressure, the circumstances and opportunities in 
performing a decided behavior (Ajzen, 2005; Bobek & Hatfield, 2003). Individuals are likely to select specific method minimizing 
the obstacles when doing whistleblowing such as the threat of retaliation. Anonymous reporting channels encourage whistleblowing 
intentions due to the lower personal cost through anonymous reporting channels by excluding reporter's identity and it will give a 
sense of security. Therefore, the results of this study also support previous studies (Priyastiwi & Halim, 2018), emphasizing that 
Whistleblowing intentions will be higher when at a low personal cost and through anonymous reporting channels.  
Conclusions 
To conclude, greater whistleblowing intentions occur when given financial rewards compared to not given financial rewards. In 
addition, greater whistleblowing intention appears mostly in low personal cost compared with high personal cost. Last to point out, 
whistleblowing intentions will also be greater when reporting through anonymous reporting channels than through non-anonymous 
reporting channels when given a financial reward at a low personal cost through non-anonymous reporting channels. The results of 
this study are expected to contribute the decision-makers in state universities for providing financial rewards to increase 
whistleblowing intentions. The results of this study also provide input for state universities to anticipate preventive actions and to 
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protect whistleblower from threats, along with proper decision for appropriate reporting channels at state universities in sustaining 
effective whistleblowing system.  
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